pity and some to exuberant praise. But some of the Greeks present found fault with such customs as savage and inhumane'.12 That this first recorded comment includes all the dominant ingredients of responses to sati till today -the fascination, the horror mingled with admiration, the voyeurism, the oscillation between regarding the widow as victim or as sovereign agent -is a measure of the representational stasis or circularity to which I earlier alluded.
The growth of colonial enterprises in India shaped the tone as well as frequency of comments by Europeans on the idea as well as the spectacle of sati. 3 With increasing English involvement, the accounts proliferate; simultaneously, the commentator becomes enmeshed in the scenario he describes, and the burning widow herself is progressively pictured as reaching out to the white man watching her: 'I stood close to her, she observed me attentively,' writes William Hodges;`4 Mandelso claims that she gives him a bracelet; Thomas Bowery receives some flowers from another's hair. By the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century, the recurrent theme of what Spivak calls 'white men saving brown women from brown men' has crystallized.'5 Legend has it that Job Charnock, the founder of Calcutta, rescued from the flames a Brahmin widow and lived with her for 14 years till her death; European fiction from Jules
Verne's Around the World in Eighty Days to M. M. Kaye's The Far Pavilions is
obsessed with such rescues. Sati became, as is well known, simultaneously the moral justification for empire and an ideal of female devotion. Katherine Mayo's Mother India had blamed all of India's ills on the Indian male's 'manner of getting into the world and his sex-life thenceforward'. London's New Statesman and Nation said that the book demonstrated 'the filthy personal habits of even the most highly educated classes in India -which, like the denigration of Hindu women, are unequalled even among the most primitive African or Australian savages'.'6 Sati was emblematic of this denigration; at the same time, even the harshest colonial criticism included a sneaking admiration for the sati as the ideal wife who represented 'the wholly admirable sentiment and theory, that the union of man and woman is lifelong and the one permanent thing in the world'.'7 The idealisation of the burning widow, of course, goes back much earlier: Montaigne, for example, in his essay, 'Of Virtue', writes at length about the resolute widow, 'with a gay countenance, as if going, as she says, to sleep with her husband'.'8 John Master's novel about the thuggee cult, The Deceivers, is particularly interesting in this regard -its British hero, who is an administrator in a small district of central India, disguises himself as an Indian man to prevent his wife from committing sati. During the course of the story, this impersonation is transformed into a psychic drama whereby his British and Christian identities conflict with his passionate fascination with and seduction by the cult of thuggee and its patron goddess, Kali, so that as the end of the novel he helps the same widow to immolate herself.
These contradictory responses to sati -as a powerful male fantasy of female devotion, and an instance of Hindu barbarism -both fuelled the voyeuristic fascination of the colonial gaze and impelled the narrative division, in the first half of the colonial debate on widow immolation in nineteenth-century India, of satis into good and bad ones. In the initial years of imperial rule, following their declared policy of non-interference with native religions and customs, the British made no efforts to stop the practice, (although Albuquerque had prohibited it within the Portuguese territory of Goa in 1510), ostensibly because of their declared policy of In 1813 a legislation was enacted which defined sati as legal if it met certain criteria, chief among which was that it be a voluntary act. From then on, the government's strategy was simply to make it increasingly difficult to achieve the state of legality, hence the age, caste, and the physical state of the 'ideal' sati were increasingly regulated. One obvious implication here is that once these criteria were met, sati could be sanctioned: an implication that re-surfaced in the post-Deorala debate when pro-sati commentators insisted on the voluntary status of the true sati. It is relevant to note here that, between 1813 and 1816, it is estimated that only ten illegal satis were prevented out of a total of 400 that occurred in the Presidency of Bengal.'9 Lata Mani's is the most extensive commentary on the entire colonial debate; she shows how, prior to the 1813 legislation, the colonial administration 'generated' a particular kind of information about the practice by extensively questioning pundits resident at the courts. The pundits were instructed to respond with 'a reply in conformity with the scriptures'.20 In the process, a scriptural sanction and a religion tradition were constructed for a practice which had been diverse, variable and uneven. Veena Das reaches a similar conclusion: by annexing the category of 'vyavahara'. or usage to the category of law, she says, 'what may have been contextual and open to interpretation, or limited to certain castes only, became frozen as "law"'. 21 Hence the British virtually orchestrated the articulation of a textual tradition and scriptural sanction for widow immolation, made pundits the spokesmen for a vast and heterogeneous Hindu population, and thereby calcified in new and dangerous ways the existing hierarchies of Hindu society. Because they had strategically divided sati into illegal and legal, involuntary and voluntary ones, British officials were directed to be present at each burning and tabulate its details, to see that no coercion was used. But conversely officials were sometimes reprimanded for disallowing a legal immolation!22
Following the 1813 legislation, most commentators agree, there was a sharp increase in the number of satis. From 378 in 1815, it went up to 839 in 1818. This increase spurred the movement for straightforward abolition; Raja Ram Mohan Roy published his first pamphlet on the subject, and in England there was a spate of protests. The final abolition in 1829 is regarded as a sort of landmark in the history of Indian women; commentators allot the credit for it to different people according to their own ideological positions: hence Thompson attributes it entirely to the efforts of William Bentinck, the then Governor General, as does V. N. Datta; Ashis Nandy predictably gives Roy pride of place,23 and only Lata Mani traces the complex interpenetration of interests in a way that takes into account the entire spectrum of positions on this subject. Comments on the increase of satis in 1818 are also significant; many British officials simply attributed it to a cholera epidemic. Edward Thompson, like some others, read it as a sign of excessive native obedience to British law: 'I think there can be no doubt that the sanction of the Government was constituted ... a threat to them. In their desperate defence of the rite they were also trying to defend their traditional self-esteem'.25 Certain statistics seem to support such a conclusion: for example, a modification of the legislation in 1817 forbade widows of the Brahmin caste to commit sati as it was contrary to the shastras. In 1823, out of a total of 576 satis, 235 were Brahmin widows. Nandy's analysis has also been contested on the grounds that there is no easy correlation between this increase in widow burning and the 'marginalised groups' he identifies,26 but it remains important for at least two reasons.
First, by arguing that the colonial conflict calcified indigenous patriarchal practices, Nandy's was one of the pioneering attempts to trace the multiple connections between colonial power and gender relations. Later feminist work on British India has considered in greater depth and with more sophistication how the colonial disenfranchisement of Indian men led to a situation whereby women became the grounds and signs for the colonial struggle. Indian nationalisms of different shades produced their own versions of the good Hindu wife, each of which became emblematic of Indian-ness and tradition, a sign of rebellion against colonial authority and a symbol of the vision of the future.27 In the process, women's own questioning of patriarchal authority -both indigenous and colonial -were specifically marginalised. While writings on sati have been a fruitful ground for drawing attention to the ways in which women become signifiers of the colonial conflict (and here Lata Mani provided the most detailed account), they have not sufficiently probed why the signs acquired the meanings they did for both Indians and the British, or considered the process whereby the divisions between masculine and feminine, public and private, active and passive, colonial and native came to acquire overlapping meanings. Such questions are necessary if one is not to assume that these terms carry universal and always already constituted meanings. Here other work on women in colonial India has been more nuanced. Rosalind Now, these are almost exactly the terms in which Lata Mani, in essays written before the Deorala incident, had described the colonial discourse on the subject. Brilliantly unravelling the rhetorical and ideological overlaps between seemingly opposed views in the debates between the colonial government, the nationalist reformers and the indigenous pro-sati lobby, Mani points out that 'the entire issue was debated within the framework of the scriptures'.33 Even Indian reformers, epitomised by Raja Ram Mohan Roy, argued against sati by contending that it had no scriptural sanction and that it was custom and not the Hindu religion that had fostered the practice.
At first glance, then, it seems that little has changed between the colonial situation and 1987. But Nandy's own analytical moves -towards subscribing to a division that he had earlier analysed, and invoking an ideal of mythical sati that represents an Indian tradition, a tradition that he had earlier seen as constructed out of the tensions of colonialism -help us identify the definitive contextual shifts. His conflation of 'respect' for an ideal sati with rural India, native authenticity and the canny cultural instincts of the average Indian clearly positions him as a sophisticated example of the nativism which Gayatri Spivak has repeatedly targeted as a major pitfall for the post-colonial intellectual. It is significant that such nativism, like its earlier counterparts, bases itself on a posited notion of an ideal woman or femininity.
Significantly too, the target of Nandy's anger today is not the colonial state but Indian feminists who are seen as deculturalised, inauthentic, westernised and alienated from an appreciation of their own culture, which their village sisters embody in the act of immolating themselves. Here Nandy has a wide range of allies: Mark Tully, BBC's veteran correspondent in New Delhi, endorsed such a view. In his essay on the Deorala sati, he pitted the 'Committee for the Protection of Religion', under whose banner '100,000 Rajputs assembled in Jaipur to hear speeches calling on them to defend Hinduism against the Westernized elite, 'independent women', urban 'journalists -as fundamentalist in their blind faith in modernity as the young Rajputs were in their beliefs', against 'academics' and most significantly, against 'those feminists who jumped at the opportunity the tragedy of Deorala gave to promote their views on women's rights'. 34 Here, the desire of the Hindu wife for her husband is accorded a recognition that is otherwise entirely absent in patriarchal discourses. Ironically but hardly surprisingly, this recognition of desire and of subjectivity, and of agency, leads to the annihilation of the woman; hence female desire is allowed but a spectacular moment, a swan's song that announces her ceasing to be.39 After the Deorala incident, it was not only the pro-sati lobby that invoked the widow's desire. The new legislations on sati introduced by the Indian Government and the Rajasthan State Government, both of which were avowedly concerned with effectively eradicating widow immolation as well as its 'glorification', implicitly cast the woman herself as agent of the crime. The Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, states: whoever attempts to commit sati and does any act towards the commission shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to a fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees but which may also extend to twenty thousand rupees. The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with 'woman' as a pious item. Representation has not withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish. 48 The intellectual whom Spivak here calls to arms is almost by definition the Indian woman academic working in the metropolitan academy, a woman who must struggle against the neo-colonial impulses of that space without succumbing to the nostalgic gestures of her counterpart in the third world.
It is no accident that such a project focuses on the immolated widow, who, in Spivak's work, becomes the ground for formulating a critique of colonialism, of indigenous patriarchy, of contemporary critical and cultural theories and of revisionist historiographies. She provides the most suitable language for talking about silence: she is, after all, a conceptual and social category that comes into being only when the subject dies. The to-be-sati is merely a widow, the sati is by definition a silenced subject. Caught between a notion of representation that comes too easily, as in the case of nineteenth-century British feminists, and another that recognises its contingencies and difficulties, like Spivak's, the Indian woman remains silent: she still 'cannot speak'. An insistence on subaltern silence is disquieting for those who are engaged in precisely the task of recovering such voices; it can be linked to Spivak's curious detachment, in these essays, from the specificities of post-colonial politics. But her argument for the validity, indeed necessity, of representation ironically takes on, as I hope to show below, a specially urgent resonance in the very arena she does not address: the struggles of third world feminists in their own countries, and in this case, India.
From the earliest commentaries onwards, only two options are offered for the dead widow: she either wanted to die or was forced to. Each option marks a dead end for feminist investigations. In the first case, we are dangerously close to the 'radiant heroism' of the willing widow which is suggested by both British and Indian male commentators. In the second case, fears have been voiced that if we refuse to 'grant sati the dubious status of existential suicide' we will find ourselves 'in another bind, that of viewing the sati as inexorably a victim and thereby emptying her subjectivity of any function or agency'.49 Edward Thompson, in a section called 'The Psychology of the "Satis"' easily combined both ideas:
I had intended to try and examine this; but the truth is, it has ceased to be a puzzle to me. Obviously the mental state of the women who were sacrificed varied infinitely, as that of martyrs for religion or patriotism. The Rajput lady who died when a foe girdled her city and her whole sex was swept away, or who ascended the pyre with her lord newly slain in battle, was in a mood that had no contact or resemblance with the mood of the cowed and unwilling slave-girl.50
In those essays where Lata Mani uncovers the common ground on which dichotomies between willing and unwilling satis were constructed, she declares that she herself is 'not concerned here with what the practice of sati meant to those who undertook it', suggesting in a footnote that we turn to Ashis Nandy's essay, which, however, does not concern itself at all with the points of view of satis or would-be satis.5' It seems to me that, until very recently, Mani was unable to proceed significantly beyond Edward Thompson's dichotomies. 52 Let me attempt to answer these questions by returning to the question of the subaltern's experience and her pain as they figure in Sunder Raj an's essay, which searches the post-colonial discourse on sati for representations of the widow's pain. Analysing the law, the media, feminist analyses, and the Indian women's movement, she finds that the pain of the sati is represented only in 'forms of agitprop representations in theater, film and posters' which bring 'us closer to the "reality" of sati than does either the liberal discourse denouncing it or the popular and religious discourse glorifying it'(p. 16). It is significant, I think, that an essay which begins with an inquiry into subjectivity and the individual subject ends up with what in fact is one of the most succint accounts of the political situation after the Deorala sati. Sunder Rajan discusses how the Indian media and others writing on the Deorala incident persistently attempted to re-construct the subjectivity of Roop Kanwar, and shows how the assumption that the 'answer to such a complex mystery is to be sought in knowing the sati herself, leads all too often to a closure of analysis, her death creating a condition of definitional unknowability' . She herself is forced to conclude 'that an exclusive focus on choice and motivation in constructing the subjectivity of the sati in some representations leads either to mystification or to cognitive closure'. I say she is 'forced to conclude' because Sunder Rajan does not draw out the implications of her own work. Why is it that a projectwhich seeks to unravel subjectivity ends up by describing, and by valorising (albeit somewhat uneasily) the representation of sati in agit-prop posters and by social movements?
Even though I find her use of the subject-in-pain model somewhat problematic, I think Sunder Rajan's essay is crucial in implicitly moving towards a collective subjectivity of agents -in this case this would not be a collectivity of satis or even of widows but rather of huge, if not all, sections of-Indian women who suffer from the consequences of the ideology of sati. I would like to suggest that 'the subaltern' 'in the text of sati', if we must locate one, cannot be understood simply as the immolated widow. The sati is produced by and functions to recirculate ideologies which target and seek to position a largerbody of women, whose experiences, articulations and silences are crucial to understanding the relations of power and insubordination which are central to any analysis of 'the subaltern'.
It is entirely true that to focus on the pain of the burning widow is at once to draw attention to the shared indifference to women on the part of both defenders and abolitionists of sati, then and now, and to remind ourselves that sati is not just a symbol and a figuration, but a tortuous experience. However, recovering that experience, or locating agency within the temporal and experiential boundaries of the act of widow immolation is fraught with the dangers of succumbing to its grotesque power and its ideal authenticity at the expense of understanding how and why it is produced in the first place. Joan Scott's critique of 'experience' as a foundational historical category is useful in drawing attention to the dangers of Scarry's epistemology of pain even when it is used as cautiously as it is by Sunder Rajan. Scott points out that experience works as a foundation providing both a starting point and a conclusive kind of explanation, beyond which few questions need to or can be asked. And yet it is precisely the questions precluded -questions about discourse, difference and subjectivity, as well as about what counts as experience and who gets to make that determination -that would enable us to historicize experience, to reflect critically on the history we write about it, rather than to premise our history upon it.' If we are not to take either identity or experience for granted, we should look at how they are 'ascribed, resisted or embraced', she writes.
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Such an exercise points to several directions in which work on sati still needs to be done. Colonial accounts voyeuristically focus on the spectacle of burning and obsessively describe the beautiful young widow as she strips herself of clothes and ornaments to ascend the fire.6' An alternative view that exposes the pain and ugliness of the event must also guard against sealing it off from what precedes or follows it. The sati's experience is not limited to the pain of a death: a whole life is brought to the violence of that event, which, if unpacked, can be seen as constructed -not just crudely by her fears of a miserable life as a widow, not just by familial economic designs on her property, not even by male anxieties about her sexuality, but by social and ideological interactions, pressures and configurations that connect her immediate situation to the politics of her community, and indeed of the nation, and to the crucial articulations of gender within each of them. Some feminist work produced in India has been moving towards making these connections visible. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid have meticulously documented specific cases of sati and delineated their 'contexts'. 62 Their writings certainly speculate on the ideologies that connect one burning to another, but they also focus on what was at stake in staging each immolation.
To use the word 'staging' is problematic in as much as it might be seen to deny the part played by the individual psyche and drives in enabling the violence of a sati. Such a denial is, unfortunately, emblematic of much feminist work produced in India, and elsewhere I touch upon how it is sometimes produced by a suspicion of 'western feminist theory' which is thereby flattened out and cast entirely as 'liberal-humanist' or as focussing on the psychic, the sexual and the individual at the expense of the political and the social.63 This is not the space to discuss the debilitating effects of recasting a divide between the East and the West on the grounds of feminist studies, although it should be obvious that such a dichotomy works to the detriment of nuanced understandings of gender politics anywhere. There is no necessary contradiction between focusing on the social and the psychic: Jacqueline Rose has pointed out that 'ideology is effective . .. because it works at the most rudimentary levels of psychic identity and its drives'.'4 In such an understanding, the individual psyche and the social exist in a constitutive, traumatic, reciprocity; the violence and pathologies of the one being symptomatic of the other. In the case of sati, this violent reciprocity is the reason why 'choice' has no meaning apart from its multiple determinations. Sangari and Vaid do not address this traumatic relation, but they do point out the ways in which the widow's desire is understood only when it is expressed as a willingness to die. Hence the sati's 'power' lies in her will to die and comes into being only when she expresses that will.65 Therefore it is visible only when it is compliant with dominant ideologies.
The 1987 episode of sati was particularly frightening for feminists in India precisely because it was embedded within a context in which various types of murders are constructed as questions of female choice. When wives are burnt for dowry it is alleged that they committed suicide. The systematic abortion of female foetuses in contemporary India, it has been argued, is only a question of 'choice' on the part of the mothers-to-be. The debate over these amniocentesis-determined abortions also highlights the dubious status of women's experience and of a feminist politics that valorises it.' Then there was the case of Shahbano, where the elderly Muslim divorcee petitioned the courts for alimony, a right granted by the civil code of the country but not by the Muslim personal Law. When she won the case, Muslim fundamentalists forced her to withdraw her petition in the name of her religion. It was then argued that women's groups had no right to petition further since the individual woman had made her choice. These groups, however, continued to 'represent', not Shahbano the individual, but the politics of gender and of community identity which the case had thrown up.67 All of these issues were articulated, by communal, nationalist or patriarchal voices, as issues of female and individual choice. In each of them, such a formulation pushed for a cognitive and discursive closure that would protect existing inequalities for women, or create new ones. And in each case, feminists had to insist on their right to represent other women, although they did not speak merely for the subaltern as much as insist that much was at stake for women's groups, for larger bodies of women, and for the Indian polity at large.68
The debate on sati, then, signals the need to take into account two sorts of collective subjects in order to reposition the individual subject within them -the first is the collectivity of women at large, and the second a politically organised collectivity of women. The first would highlight that, despite its spectacular nature, the sati is not an isolated event; the second would indicate the ways in which female agency is wrought out of precariously achieved political intervention. Taken together, the two collectivities do not seek to bypass, devalue or erase the suffering, the pain or the determinations of the individual subject. They do, however, extend Spivak's notion of representation: the 'truth' about Roop Kanwar is not exclusively or best represented by the post-colonial feminist intellectual, but by an intersection of the two collectivities mentioned above. In the post-Deorala debates, statements by rural women showed that they often believed in sati as a possibility even as they questioned that Roop Kanwar was a 'true' sati. But at the same time, they questioned various aspects of women's oppression in India, and showed an awareness of women's movements even when these had not touched their own lives. 69 Such an exercise, of listening to other women's voices to position the individual sati, and of detailing the individual circumstances and nuances of each immolation, is obviously easier to attempt in the present context. But I want to suggest here that if we look back, from the vantage point of a contemporary widespread backlash against the women's movement, at the bedfellows of the colonial controversy, and find that women are somehow erased there, we should not simply suppose that they were merely the grounds on which other concerns were articulated. We may modify Lata Mani's conclusions to suggest that women were, then as now, the targets as well as the grounds of the debates over tradition. This, however, calls for us to suppose a presence which at first cannot be found, an exercise that Spivak critically endorses in the case of the subaltern school of Indian historians. If women are and have always been at stake, we must look for them, both within discourses which seek to erase their self-representation and elsewhere. The writings of women who worked alongside, within or in opposition to the nationalist movements are increasingly becoming available for feminist scholars and invaluable in understanding what was at stake in nineteenth-century widow immolations.70 These writings help us understand that the debate over traditional and modernity did not merely use woman as a 'site', but specifically targeted those who challenged or critiqued the patriarchal underpinnings of nationalist discourses. The more feminist research uncovers these hitherto hidden and erased voices, the clearer it becomes that the precursors of today's feminists, as individuals and as a potential collectivity, constituted a threat and were thus at least partially the target of earlier rewritings of 'tradition'. The bitter lessons of the present resurgence of communalism in India Dead Women Tell No Tales 223 should make this easier to understand. Today, Hindu communalism does not simply resort to the image of a traditional, passive woman but offers its own versions of militant womanhood to counter those produced by feminist struggles.7' Indeed, the latest ironic manifestation of this is the fact that the most aggressive and masculist face of recent Hindu communalism is embodied by two women leaders, Sadhvi Rithambara and Uma Bharati.72 Communalism articulates itself as both traditional and modern, and so does nationalism; both tradition and modernity are thus fluid terms, invoked freely to serve specific class and gender interests.
I have been arguing that we can re-position the sati by looking not just at the widow who died but at those who survived to tell the tale. This tale, however, will only underline that subaltern agency, either at the individual level or at the collective, cannot be idealised as pure opposition to the order it opposes; it works both within that order and displays its own contradictions. Finally, identity is not just a matter of self-perception. In an article called 'The Plight of Hindu Widows as Described by a Widow Herself', which first appeared in The Gospel of All Lands in April 1889, the writer describes the misery of a wife following the death of her husband:
None of her relatives will touch her to take her ornaments off her body. That task is assigned to three women from the barber caste . .. those female fiends literally jump all over her and violently tear all the ornaments from her nose, ears etc. In that rush, the delicate bones of the nose and ear are sometimes broken.
Sometimes . . . tufts of hair are also plucked off. . . At such times grief crashes down on the poor woman from all sides . . . there is nothing in our fate but suffering from birth to death. When our husbands are alive, we are their slaves; when they die, our fate is even worse. . . Thousands of widows die after a husband's death. But far more have to suffer worse fates throughout their lives if they stay alive. Once, a widow who was a relative of mine died in front of me. She had fallen ill before her husband died. When he died, she was so weak that she could not even be dragged to her husband's cremation. She had a burning fever. Then her mother-in-law dragged her down from the cot onto the ground and ordered the servant to pour bucketfuls of cold water over her. After some eight hours, she died. But nobody came to see how she was when she was dying of the cold. After she died, however, they started praising her, saying she had died for the love of her husband. . . If all [such] tales are put together they would make a large book. The British government put a ban on the custom of sati, but as a result of that several women who could have died a cruel but quick death when their husbands died now have to face an agonizingly slow death.73
The widows in this narrative come close to those constructed by colonial records and accounts. The speaker herself offers a functionalist explanation of the sati's desire to die. And yet, she herself, a potential sati, did not die. In speaking, she reveals not just a tremulous or vacillating subjectivity but an awareness of the traumatic constructedness of one's own 'experience'. Identity is both self-constructed, and constructed for us.
To conclude, feminist theory is still working out the connections between social determinations and individual subjectivity. The work on sati demonstrates how the contexts of utterance and intervention still determine which of these two will be stressed, but it also marks a space where a fruitful dialogue has begun to emerge.
